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Evolutionary Model of Existing Competition and Voluntary Disclosure  
 
Abstract 
We analyze how, in the absence of capital market incentives, the influence of existing 
competition on voluntary disclosure is an evolving process which has a non-monotonic design. 
The progressive capability of rivals to forecast significant information and the increasing losses 
of abnormal profits during the industry life cycle generate fears and incentives that change the 
sign of the relationship between competition and the probability of voluntary disclosure 
throughout the industry’s development. We support this new design empirically by applying a 
semi-parametric Cox model to 28 years of archival data for the entire Spanish newspaper sector. 
We also find that the best fitting model is the first harmonic of a Fourier series.  
 
 
 
 
 
  Keywords: Competition; Voluntary disclosure; Fourier series; Cox model. 
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Evolutionary Model of Existing Competition and Voluntary Disclosure 
 
1. Introduction 
 
To date, the relationship between competition and voluntary disclosure is an open question with 
different and contradictory theoretical answers (Verrecchia and Weber, 2006, p. 796). From an 
empirical focus, results do not help to eliminate irresolution since there are studies that have 
found significant support for each of the conflicting theoretical proposals (Dedman and Lennox, 
2009, p. 211).  Despite more than 40 years of research, there is no suitable explanation that makes 
such a diversity of results coherent.   
The aim of this paper is to contribute a new eclectic explanation where the relationship between 
existing competition and voluntary disclosure is a dynamic process that evolves with the industry 
life cycle. The strategic importance of private information (Verrecchia, 1983), the necessity of 
informing rivals to avoid overproduction (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990), and the ability of 
competitors to forecast relevant information (Backer and McFarland, 1968) are the factors that 
modulate the sign of the slope between competition and voluntary disclosure. The successive 
changes in intensity of these strengths throughout a industry’s lifetime produce a non-monotonic 
function. 
As it was necessary to analyze the evolution of one industry, we chose to examine the decisions 
on voluntary disclosure of only one industry in-depth (all firms over an extended period of time). 
We selected the total population of Spanish newspapers from 1966 to 1993 as the institutional 
setting. We decided on this period because the entire sector was private during that period. This 
aspect neutralizes capital market incentives for both banks and stockholders (Dedman and 
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Lennox, 2009, p. 211). Finally, we selected the newspaper industry since a firm’s entire 
performance can be summarized in a single variable: circulation   (the number of newspapers 
sold). This characteristic is fundamental for several reasons. First, this variable, in this sector, is 
the most important one for both producers (sellers) and clients (buyers) since it directly links the 
industry’s two sources of revenue:  newspaper sales and income from advertising, the price of 
which is established as a consequence of the number of newspapers sold. Second, we only need 
to study whether these firms disclose or withhold this figure; we do not need to analyze the 
number of items exhibited or the quality of the information revealed. An interesting additional 
advantage is that, as in other countries such as France and the U.S., this information is audited by 
an independent organism (OJD-Oficina de Justificación de la Difusión-“Office of Justification of 
the Diffusion”). All of these factors place us within the initial assumptions of Grossman (1981) 
and Milgrom (1981) by leaving out aspects such as the possibility of cheap-talk (Newman and 
Sansing, 1993; Gigler, 1994; Evans and Sridhar, 2002). Moreover, this population represents one 
of the first examples used to illustrate this controversy (Foster, 1986, p. 38).  
This paper makes four contributions to existing literature. First, we challenge the theoretical 
status quo by showing that the pattern of existing competition’s influence on the probability of 
voluntary disclosure is non-monotonic. Whereas previous literature discussed whether the 
relationship strictly increases or decreases, we find a theoretical explanation that changes the sign 
of this relation in accordance with the evolutionary phases the industry is in at a given time. In 
this way, the question, “Which influence is right?” should be exchanged for “Which phase is the 
industry in?”. If we know the latter, we will be able to answer the former. Second, we confirm 
the relevance of the number of competitors as the measure of competition (Dedman and Lennox, 
2009). Third, we regain the importance of archival documents in estimating competition. Thus, 
we can specialize and analyze the diverse dimensions within the concept of competition in much 
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greater depth. And finally, we prove that these results are robust since we use panel data from 28 
years in the same industry which removes the possibility of spurious results by cross analysis 
through sectors.   
Section 2 presents previous literature within this research stream. Section 3 then deals with our 
particular view of the phenomenon as theoretical background, Section 4 describes the 
institutional setting and the data base, Section 5 specifies variable measurement and empirical 
models, Section 6 develops the results and finally, we present our conclusions.  
 
2. Related literature  
 
Figure 1 displays all papers that have, to our knowledge, studied the influence of competition on 
voluntary disclosure of information. Since “Proprietary Costs”, when produced by the 
competition, was the first intuition that linked both variables, the central circle represents this 
hypothesis (Backer and McFarland, 1968; Mautz, 1968), that is, the negative relationship 
between competition and voluntary disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983). We divide the figure into three 
sets of papers:  theoretical papers are gathered on the lower right, econometric tests on the left, 
and surveys or interviews on the upper right.   
The direction of the arrows indicates ratification of the central hypothesis if it points towards the 
central circle or its refutation if the arrow points away. Among the papers that refute the 
proprietary cost hypothesis, we include the significant positive relationship between competition 
and voluntary disclosure (most papers), and the absence of significance (e.g. Botosan and Harris, 
2000; Berger and Hann, 2007 and Li, 2010) as it also argues against the initial negative 
relationship. 
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Fig. 1. Review of Literature 
 
Additionally, there are some arrows which point in both directions (e.g. Backer and McFarland, 
1968; Wagenhofer, 1990; Darrough, 1993; Shin, 2002 and Li, 2009). These studies both ratify 
and refute the proprietary cost hypothesis depending on the diverse circumstances that each paper 
deals with, or according to the kind of test used, sometimes there is significant support in favor, 
and other times against.  
To summarize the state of the art in this research source, there are eight theoretical works, 
although only three are completely in favor of the proprietary cost hypothesis. There are also 18 
econometric tests, but only three are clearly in favor. The majority of the remaining 15 find 
evidence against while a few have mixed results. Finally, there are six papers that develop 
surveys or interviews with evidence in both directions. As a consequence, the only evidence is 
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that there is no clear theoretical or empirical support for “Proprietary Costs” hypothesis or for its 
alternative. 
The many nuances of this research line are beyond the scope of our work. However, there are two 
groups of articles which are the cornerstones of this research. First of all, the four papers in bold 
in Figure 1 (and later included afterwards in Figure 2): three are theoretical (Verrecchia, 1983; 
Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Clich and Verrecchia, 1997) and one is a test (Harris, 1998). In a 
static context, these four papers could all seem to be against. However, when we consider a 
dynamic and evolving process, they are actually defining the sector’s progress in relation to the 
influence of competition on voluntary disclosure. The second group of papers includes surveys 
and interviews (Backer and McFarland, 1968; Mautz, 1968; Emmanuel and Garrod, 1987; 
Edwards and Smith, 1996; Graham et al., 2005; Dedman and Lennox, 2009). The results that they 
get are very similar. Most managers disagree or strongly disagree with disclosing information, in 
line with the proprietary cost hypothesis. However, in all cases, they also find evidence that some 
managers agree or strongly agree with disclosing more information or at minimum, they are 
indifferent. That is what led us to use arrows in both directions to illustrate them. Despite the fact 
that they always speak in favor of the central hypothesis, or to be more precise, they carry out 
research to prove the existence of proprietary cost, nonetheless, they also find people that 
disagree with this hypothesis. Table 1 summarizes these results extracted from the surveys: 
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Table 1 
Attitude towards disclosing information 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Indifferent Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Backer and McFarland, 1968 16.4% 5.9%  23.8% 53.7% 
Mautz, 1968 8.1% 25.1% 6.7% 27.6% 32.5% 
Edwards and Smith, 1996 (Before SSAP25) 28% 8% 9% 26% 29% 
Edwards and Smith, 1996 (After SSAP25) 31% 27% 17% 15% 
Graham et al., 2005 24.8% 16.4% 58.8% 
Dedman and Lennox, 2009 17.5% 82.5 
The table reports the summary of percentages in relation to the different attitudes towards voluntary disclosure that 
the surveys reveal. Some cells are combined since all authors do not explain their results in detail. 
 
In light of this report, although there are few studies, it is difficult to imagine that managers can 
have such opposing opinions regarding the same phenomenon. We believe that the real 
explanation is they are looking at different events; that is they see and describe the circumstances 
of their own sectors at their different stages. 
 
3. Theoretical background 
 
The evolution of the industry life cycle in any sector means the simultaneous occurrence of two 
different events affecting private disclosure:  a gradual loss of abnormal profits (Harris, 1998); 
and a progressive ability to anticipate important data without the necessity for firms to disclose 
confidential information (Backer and McFarland, 1968, p. 84-85; Emmanuel and Garrod, 1987, 
p. 237). Both factors generate varying degrees of incentives and fears at different stages of the 
sector’s maturity, altering trends in relation to the probability of voluntary disclosure. 
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Fig. 2. Theoretical Summary. Evolution of the relationship between existing competition and the probability of 
voluntary disclosure 
 
Figure 2 outlines our theoretical reasoning. On the x-axis, we represent real competition with the 
number of rivals existing at a given point. The competition of an industry evolved from its birth 
through its maturity (Klepper, 1996): the number of producers grows firstly because when the 
industry is new there are a lot of entry competitors, hitting the highest point, after which there 
could be a decline in the number of competitors because of exists overtakes entry. We consider 
this to be the evolution of the industry.  The y-axis depicts attitude towards the disclosure of 
private information. On the right side, we use the common terminology used by the most 
representative surveys to date (e.g. Backer and McFarland, 1968, p. 78; Graham et al., 2005, p. 
60; Mautz, 1968, p. 196). However, on the left, we convert these terms to a multiplier model
1
 
                                                          
1
 We choose a multiplicative relationship between competition and the probability of voluntary disclosure, to directly test our 
theoretical argument with a standard econometric model: Cox Proportional Hazard Model. As explained below, this model has 
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where the value of 1 represents indifference to showing information or not, thus a factor of one 
has no effect. However, values greater than 1 increment the probability of voluntary disclosure, 
and values smaller than 1 reduce this same probability. Bearing this composition in mind, Figure 
2 also shows four different stages in the total evolution of the sector. The particular reasoning 
behind stages A, B, C and D is that we consider the relationship between competition and the 
probability of voluntary disclosure to be a continuous function with no rupture points. 
Stage A (Infancy): The sector is at its beginning. At the first point (Point α in Figure 2) there is no 
competition, that is, the number of rivals is equal to zero; we are at the first point of indifference. 
If a factor does not exist, then it has no influence, either positive or negative. The newness of the 
sector impedes competitors from obtaining private information easily since few innovations are 
able to generate important advantages, and as a consequence, abnormal profits. Competition is 
minimal, but releasing private news can eliminate these extra profits since it is the only source of 
information. Under these conditions, producers need to protect meaningful information, and this 
quickly reduces the probability of their releasing private information as a consequence of high 
proprietary costs (Verrecchia, 1983). 
Stage B ( Adolescence): The previous situation continues to decrease the probability of voluntary 
disclosure, but strategic assets tend to disappear (Bamber and Cheon, 1998). Private information 
continues to be important, but less and less relevant in relation to the increment in competition 
and, as a consequence, the desire to protect it flags (Harris 1998). Our function reaches a 
minimum from which producers continue to hide strategic information, but with decreasing 
strength. In a similar proportion to the reduction of abnormal profits, managers lose enthusiasm 
and tend towards indifference (Point λ in Figure 2). 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
several advantages to handle this specific problem. However, with no loss of generality, we would get identical conclusions with 
additive alternatives.  
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Stage C (Maturity): Despite the fact that stages B and C may seem similar, there is a fundamental 
difference: from Point λ, firms surpass indifference, and voluntarily begin to release information. 
It is one thing to give up hiding strategic information because it is not so important and quite 
another to actively inform the competition of the market situation. In spite of the competitors’ 
increasing capability to forecast relevant information in the sector over the three stages, the 
components of the sector must still release private information regarding the generalized absence 
of good news and thereby avoid overproduction (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Feltham and 
Xie, 1992).  
Stage D (Saturation): Bad news is generalized since competition is at a maximum and there are 
no extra profits. However, the capability of the competitors to learn about new information 
reaches its highest level. The competition tends to know everything or almost everything when 
the sector is at maximum maturity without the necessity of releasing private information (Backer 
and McFarland, 1968, p. 84-85; Emmanuel and Garrod, 1987, p. 237). If new releases do not 
contribute new information because the competitors are able to anticipate everything, the 
producers do not have any incentive to continue informing and, as a consequence, they go back to 
indifference at Point ω in Figure 2.  This last relationship again generates an inverse influence 
between competition and the probability of voluntary disclosure (Clinch and Verrecchia, 1997) 
 
4. Research setting 
 
We chose to analyze the disclosure policies of the daily newspaper publishing industry in 
Spain in the period of 1966-1993. The database is composed of the information of 276 
newspapers gathered from three different sources. The first is the Registry of Journalistic Firms 
(Registro de Empresas Periodísticas), which was created by the Law of Press and Printing (Ley 
de Prensa e Imprenta) on March 18, 1966. This law mandates the recording of any newspaper 
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that is in circulation in Spain from this date. The second source is the General Mass Media Guide 
(Guía General de Medios de Comunicación), a publication in which newspapers advertise their 
price lists. Each of these sources confirms the information of the others. They provide 
organizational and individual information for each publication which we have used to build the 
variables included in our tests: title, founding date, the exact date they ceased operations, content, 
coverage, location, language, etc. The final source of data is the reports produced by the 
independent, non-profit newspaper association, the OJD (Oficina para la Justification de la 
Difusión). Similar to the Audit Bureau of Circulations in the USA or the Office de Justification 
des Tirages in France, the function of this association is to audit the number of newspapers sold 
(circulation). Through the same Law of Press and Printing, the OJD was created to audit the 
circulation of any newspaper that requests it. In exchange, it receives a small fee, proportional to 
each firm’s turnover. Newspapers are not compelled to be audited by the OJD; it is completely 
voluntary. However, if this service is requested, the newspaper must accept a rigorous and 
extensive examination of any functional, operational or accounting processes required by the 
OJD in order to validate the circulation figure certified by the OJD. This is important to our 
research because the Spanish newspaper industry uses the OJD as its means of voluntary 
disclosure of its most relevant performance figure: circulation or number of newspapers sold. 
There are several advantages derived from studying this industry. First, its simplicity 
avoids the influence of any odd factors or those which are difficult to control. This absence of 
complexity affects several aspects. First, these firms have only one main product, the newspaper, 
and every firm offers only one newspaper in the period we have analyzed. Newspapers are almost 
perfectly substitutive: prices for readers are similar throughout the entire industry, and for any 
given period. Due to the fact that newspapers comprise several specializations, such as content or 
location, they can be controlled for in tests. Second, all firms belong to the same industry, the 
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same country, and are relatively isolated from the global foreign market as a consequence of the 
particular languages that exist in Spain (Basque, Castilian, Catalonian, and Galician).  Third, 
firms only need to disclose one figure, the circulation or number of newspapers sold. Knowing 
circulation figures, anybody within this industry could easily approximate costs and revenues 
since organization and technology are simple and, in any case, very similar. This simplifies the 
analysis of voluntary disclosure considerably since we do not need to analyze how much 
information firms have, its quality, or its veracity. We only need to analyze whether the firm 
discloses or withholds circulation figures; if it chooses to reveal the information it is audited by 
the OJD. Third, this industry is within Milgrom’s (1981) and Grossman’s (1981) main 
assumption of full disclosure equilibrium. Clients (buyers) need to know circulation figures 
(synonymous with a newspaper’s quality) since the more newspapers sold, the more readers 
acquire the newspaper and consequently, see the advertisements. Actually, firms charge 
advertising prices (theoretically) based upon circulation or number of readers that will see the 
advertisements. That means that if a firm withholds this information, it is hiding its “quality” 
from clients. And finally, in this analysis, the stock market does not exert any influence on the 
firms. We have chosen a period during which these firms did not yet quote on the stock market 
(Dedman and Lennox, 2009). The main motive is to neutralize what we consider a cornerstone 
effect within this line of research. It is clear that stockholders need information about a firm’s 
performance. In the newspaper industry, due to its idiosyncrasy, sales figures are not only 
interesting for clients, but also for others interested in accounting information, including 
stockholders. With this, we recognize that firms could have sources of motivation for disclosing 
other than the aforementioned, and that they could influence their decision to disclose, 
particularly when considering the influence of the financial market.  
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5. Research design 
 
5.1.  Econometric choices 
 
Given the sophisticated pattern, the analysis compelled us to find an econometric model whose 
endogenous variable is a probability that evolves over time (in relation to the sector), and one that 
is sufficiently versatile to adjust to any new functional design, but without including restrictions 
that force results in any way. In other words, we need a model that permits the analysis of several 
firms over time and the inclusion of non-parametric methodology. We think that the Cox 
proportional hazard model fulfills both conditions for the following reasons (Lawless, 2003). 1. It 
lets us estimate the hazard rate h(t) or instantaneous rate of voluntary disclosure at time t, where t 
is the time when the newspaper could first release circulation information until the time that it 
actually does so. 
  
Thus, we have an econometric model whose endogenous variable is the probability of voluntary 
disclosure, and moreover, this variable evolves over time. 2. By itself, it is a semi-parametric 
model that allows us to estimate the design of the influence without specifying the distribution of 
the function. 3. However, it also permits us to include nonparametric methodology, avoiding any 
restriction on the functional relation between exogenous and endogenous variables (Huang, 
1999). In this case, we have chosen Fourier series, although in our sensibility analysis, we have 
used other polynomial splines. 4. Finally, this model also lets us include and analyze the 
evolution of exogenous variables such as panel data methodology over time.   
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To summarize, this model is appropriate to exploit our panel data base to the utmost, but, at the 
same time, we can use nonparametric methodology in order to avoid any suspicions that force the 
final design of our tests. 
Its general expression is: 
h(t) = h0(t).exp(x(t)γ) 
Where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, although it is not necessary to define it for the Cox 
model (it is not estimated). “Exp” is the exponential transformation since h(t) always needs to be 
positive since it is a probability; x is the vector of variables: exogenous, such as types of 
competition or its transformation, and all other control variables. And γ is the vector of regression 
coefficients to estimate. 
To analyze the functional relationship between competition and probability of voluntary 
disclosure, we choose to include the nonparametric polynomial approximation by Fourier series 
within the Cox model, since any finite function can be approximated by an infinite summation 
with this form: 
 
In this way, each harmonic, or the addition of the sine plus the cosine for each value of k, would 
be a more sophisticated approach to the objective function.  
Finally, including this kind of nonparametric analysis within the Cox model has another added 
advantage in relation to other nonparametric methodologies because we can also calculate a 
likelihood ratio test as a whole for the set of harmonics in each model. In this way, we will not 
only see the design of our function for our particular data as in other nonparametric 
methodologies, but we can also prove if the fit is more significant than for the standard 
parametric approximations in spite of including a greater number of transformations of the same 
variable .   
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As we do not have censored data, we have used maximum likelihood from Stata 11 
(StataCorp. 2009) to estimate each parameter.  
 
5.2. Variables 
 
Endogenous variable (t) 
As explained above, our endogenous variable is time from the moment in which the firm 
can release circulation information until the moment when it decides to actually do so. Hence, our 
endogenous variable measures delay of engagement on voluntary disclosure. The utilization of 
duration models directly permits us to study the influence between exogenous variables and 
probability of voluntary disclosure by means of hazard rate: h(t), as it appraises the effect of our 
explanatory variable, the delay in disclosing, on the hazard or risk of voluntary disclosure  
(Lawless, 2003). 
Exogenous variables (Competition) 
 Competition is not a unitary concept; it can be measured from several variables (Edwards 
and Smith, 1996, p. 158). Although researchers have typically used two different measures in this 
research line, concentration indexes and/or speed of abnormal profit adjustment (e.g. Harris, 
1998; Botosan and Harris, 2000; Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Nichols and Street, 2007), we have 
chosen the number of rivals competing in each period (used, for example, by Jin, 2005). The first 
and main reason for our option is that Darrough and Stoughton (1990, p. 239) point to this 
particular variable as the one responsible for Verrecchia’s findings (1983) on the opposed 
relationship between competition and voluntary disclosure. We propose that if we find that this 
variable in question also yields positive effects, it might also validate their reasoning without 
recurring to other variables which are more favorable to their arguments. Second, since we 
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analyze the same industry over time rather than different industries, the increment of new rivals 
in each period is also a good proxy for degree of concentration since it would be the same as that 
of the previous period influenced by these new entries. Hence, the increase in competition can be 
better measured by the difference among the number of rivals over diverse periods. Third, using 
the number of rivals permits us to increase the level of analysis to examine different competitive 
scopes,  breadth of firms’ activities (Porter and Millar, 1998), or clusters or location of their 
business (Porter, 1998). We measure Broad Scope by the total number of newspapers that firms 
offer within the Spanish setting; Segment Scope by the number of newspapers with the same 
content (general, sport, and others.); Geographic Scope as the number of newspapers with the 
same reporting (national, regional, or local). And finally, with Location Scope,  we measure the 
number of newspapers that are competing in the same autonomous community, not at the 
national level. Spain has 19 autonomous communities with political and administrative attributes 
that are similar to a federal state. Finally, as we have chosen to examine the period where the 
firms did not quote on the stock market, we cannot calculate the speed of abnormal profit 
adjustment. 
Control Variables 
We cannot calculate concentration indexes since the number of newspapers sold by each 
firm not revealed through the OJD is not available. As a consequence, we are not able to calculate 
the total quantity of newspapers sold according to the different scopes. However, we try to 
control Market Breadth in each period through the population of literate people older than 16 
years (in millions). We also measure the evolution of the Spanish economy by the Gross National 
Product in milliard (billion) pesetas (Spanish currency prior to the euro). Finally, we also include 
as an external control variable, the Herding Effect (e.g. Dye and Sridhar, 1995; Arya and 
Mittendorf, 2005; Mensah and Yang, 2008) since it is possible that firms disclose information as 
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a consequence of previous releases within the same industry. We have measured this effect by the 
number of newspapers that have disclosed in the previous period. 
Organizational Control Variables: 
As particular characteristics of this kind of firm, we have included Age calculated by the 
number of years of the newspaper’s existence since its foundation, whether its content is General 
(by giving a value of 1 if the newspaper has general content and 0 if otherwise),  Sport (1 if the 
newspaper has only sport content, and 0 if otherwise), whether its coverage is National (1 if 
national, 0 if otherwise), Regional (1 if regional, 0 if otherwise) and Family Firm (equal to 1 
when the newspaper is owned by a family, and 0 if otherwise).  
Finally, as a measure of firms’ performance, we include the estimation of the Probability 
of Failure (hazard rate) in any period for every firm. As in the aforementioned and like other 
organizational variables, we have not used usual performance measures such as sales or profits. 
However, we analyze panel data and can estimate a hazard rate where the event is the time from 
the firm’s beginning to its demise, the same as with our endogenous variable, but changing the 
phenomenon to be estimated. 
 
6. Empirical results 
 
6.1.  Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 displays means, standard deviations and range of all variables used in tests.  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
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Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation
Maximum Minimum
1 Competitive Broad Scope 13,903 123.347 8.531 109 145
2 Competitive Segment Scope 13,903 104.320 30.289 1 132
3 Competitive Geographic Scope 13,903 58.580 25.524 12 92
4 Competitive Location Scope 13,903 10.906 5.918 1 26
5 Market Breadth 13,903 27319 2.501.855 23848.67 31272.44
6 Gross National Product 13,903 37702.51 8.716.672 20876.6 51625.6
7 Herding Effect 13,903 62,462 15,731 5 90
8 Age 13,903 45.644 34.507 0.001 191.663
9 General Content 13,805 0.921 0.269 0 1
10 Sport Content 13,805 0.035 0.185 0 1
11 National Coverage 13,571 0.119 0.324 0 1
12 Regional Coverage 13,571 0.265 0.441 0 1
13 Family Firm 13,852 0.020 0.142 0 1
14 Probability of Failure 13,510 0.032 0.082 0.000 0.924  
 
Table 3 shows the correlations (Pearson and Spearman) between variables, two by two. The 
differences regarding correlations between the different types of competition that we have 
measured stand out. We can see that Broad Scope has a high interrelation with Segment Scope (in 
the Spearman correlation, in relation to Pearson it is considerably smaller). However, it is almost 
uncorrelated with Geographic or Location Scopes. Definitively, with these data, we can assert 
that, as indicated by Edwards and Smith (1996) the concept of competition is a multidimensional 
phenomenon, and also that it is difficult to find variables with which it can be dealt.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Pearson and Spearman Correlations 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Competitive Broad Scope 0.8350 0.6159 0.2904 0.1522 0.2627 0.2046 -0.0567 -0.0033 -0.0103 -0.0010 -0.0161 -0.0251 -0.0600
2 competitive Segment Scope 0.8257 0.6801 0.3232 0.2490 0.3208 0.2380 -0.0814 -0.0543 0.1088 0.0377 -0.0195 -0.0216 -0.0208
3 Competitive Geographic Scope 0.5161 0.5606 0.3306 0.4629 0.4999 0.4417 -0.1072 0.0013 -0.0216 -0.0486 -0.0831 -0.0372 0.1024
4 Competitive Location Scope 0.2724 0.2865 0.3021 0.2326 0.2518 0.2238 -0.1053 0.0000 -0.0142 0.0423 0.0154 -0.0842 0.0942
5 Market Breadth 0.0754 0.1086 0.3807 0.2289 0.9509 0.8609 -0.0560 -0.0367 -0.0009 0.0076 0.0287 0.0192 0.1531
6 Gross National Product 0.0940 0.1127 0.3895 0.2335 0.9805 0.9202 -0.0487 -0.0388 -0.0000 0.0095 0.0243 0.0175 0.1305
7 Herding Effect 0.1038 0.1270 0.3931 0.2296 0.9478 0.9644 -0.0271 -0.0411 0.0077 0.0162 0.0274 0.0172 0.1528
8 Age -0.0628 -0.0807 -0.1088 -0.1202 -0.0649 -0.0626 -0.0579 0.1512 -0.0691 -0.0533 0.2502 0.1980 -0.2064
9 General Content 0.0002 -0.0155 0.0004 0.0014 -0.0381 -0.0398 -0.0391 0.1511 -0.6606 -0.5209 0.1394 0.0684 -0.0078
10 Sport Content -0.0106 0.0698 -0.0172 -0.0176 0.0006 0.0020 0.0027 -0.0664 -0.6606 0.4183 -0.0623 -0.0193 -0.0040
11 National Coverage -0.0012 0.0217 -0.0423 0.0413 0.0092 0.0106 0.0114 -0.0462 -0.5209 0.4183 -0.2241 -0.1230 -0.0016
12 Regional Coverage -0.0192 -0.0166 -0.0507 0.0205 0.0289 0.0287 0.0274 0.2208 0.1394 -0.0623 -0.2241 0.1249 -0.1065
13 Family Firm -0.0267 -0.0216 -0.0369 -0.0867 0.0190 0.0196 0.0176 0.2119 0.0684 -0.0193 -0.1230 0.1249 -0.0801
14 Probability of Failure -0.0918 -0.0480 0.2034 0.0471 0.1234 0.1146 0.1244 -0.3462 -0.0063 -0.0188 -0.0506 -0.4115 -0.1663
Variables
 
Table 3 presents the Pearson (Spearman) Correlations Above (Below) the Diagonal of the Matrix. Correlations ≥ 
|0.02|significant at 1%, Correlations ≥ |0.016| at 5% and Correlations ≥ |0.014|at 10% 
 
There are no other correlations that, by their magnitude, can cause multicolinearity problems, 
with the sole exception of Gross National Product and Market Breadth with a correlation of 0.95. 
However, as both are control variables, falling outside our analysis, and given that taking them 
into consideration or not does not modify the final results, we have opted to include both of them 
in the different tests. 
 
6.2.  Empirical tests 
 
Table 4 proves the suitability of the use of Cox’s model in our tests. The proportional hazard 
assumption is the only prerequisite to validate the nonparametric Cox proportional hazard model. 
Its meaning is that every estimated parameter is unique over time. Table 4 exhibits an 
independent test for each variable and a global test for the whole model. It permits us to verify 
that the condition of proportionality is supported by our data in every one of the cases since each 
p-value is clearly greater than 0.05. 
 
Table 4 
Proportional Hazard Assumption Test 
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ρ (rho) Test χ
2 
Test Degrees of 
freedom
p-value
1 -0.029 0.12 1 0.7345
2 0.022 0.07 1 0.7962
3 0.038 0.19 1 0.6622
4 0.024 0.06 1 0.8047
5 -0.009 0.01 1 0.9171
6 -0.021 0.06 1 0.8130
7 -0.014 0.02 1 0.8748
8 0.02 0.06 1 0.8137
9 -0.020 0.06 1 0.8086
10 -0.050 0.35 1 0.5557
11 0.031 0.13 1 0.7216
12 0.029 0.11 1 0.7381
13 -0.026 0.08 1 0.7795
14 -0.020 0.03 1 0.8523
2.80 32 10.000
Probability of Failure
Competitive Broad Scope
Competitive Segment Scope
Variable
Market Breadth
Global Test
Age
Gross National Product
General Content
Sport Content
National Coverage
Regional Coverage
Family Firm
Competitive Geographic 
ScopeCompetitive Location Scope
Herding Effect
 
This table depicts the proportional hazard assumption test. The H0 of this test: there is a single ɣ over time 
(proportional); compared to H1: of which there are several (not proportional). There is an independent test for each 
variable, and a global test for the complete model. On every line is the variable and four figures: 1. ρ (rho) text or the 
statistic for testing individual covariates, 2. this ρ (rho) text is not tabulated, but is asymptotically distributed as an  χ
2
 
random variable with 1 degree of freedom, 3. degrees of freedom and, finally, 4. the p-value for the χ
2 
texts.  
 
Table 5 displays 9 econometric models. With the only exception of Model 1 where we only show 
the influences of the control variables, the others depict the influence of our four competition 
variables. Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 show the parameter and the significance level for these variables 
without any transformation as in previous literature. However, Models 3, 5, 7 and 9 exhibit the 
same but for the first harmonic of one Fourier series. In light of these results, we see how in any 
case when variables are not transformed; we do not find any level of significance. Nevertheless, 
in the other four models, in particular 7 and 9 (i.e. Geographic and Location Scopes), with only 
one harmonic, we obtain a high level of significance (p-value<0.0141 for Geographic Scope and 
p-value<0.0000 for Location Scope).  For our data, it is clear that not all competition concepts fit 
the relationship with voluntary disclosure in the same way. In particular, Broad and Segment 
Scopes are clearly non-significant. However, it is also clear that there can be a great difference 
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between using conventional methodology or  one that is adapted to the requirements of this kind 
of phenomenon. 
 
Table 5 
Cox models regressions 
 
This table shows the proportional hazard regressions of Cox’s models. For each variable, maximum likelihood 
estimators are reported in the top row and χ2 test values (in parentheses) below each coefficient. ‡. *. **. ***. and 
**** indicate significance at 10%. 5%. 1%. 0.5%. and 0.1% levels respectively. Estimated Models have the 
expression h(t)=h0(t)exp[ɣX(t)], where h(t) is the instant probability of voluntary disclosure (or Hazard Rate), t is 
the time when the event occurs (voluntary disclosure in our case), h0(t) is baseline hazard (undefined in Cox's 
model), ɣ is the vector of estimated multiplicative coefficients shown in this table, X the vector of Fourier series of 
exogenous variables and the controls gathered in the first column. 
 
Figure 3 plots the joint effect of each harmonic for every competition variable (Models 3, 5, 7 
and 9). At first glance, and despite the different degree of significance between variables, we can 
see how, in any case, the relationship between competition and probability of voluntary 
disclosure is non-monotonic as we put forward in our theoretical background. However, when 
we only analyze the significant models, the design practically coincides with our entire 
theoretical development. Only in the case of Geographical Scope is there slight deviation from 
Variable/Competitive Scope
1 Competition (In Levels) -0.018 -0.022 0.007 0.010
(-0.90) (-1.04) (0.23) (0.57)
2 Cos(Competition) -0.450 -0.028 -0.411 -0.002
3 Sin(Competition) 0.013 -0.232 0.363 -0.548
(2.79) (0.68) (8.52) (20.48)
4 Market Breadth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 * 0.000* 0.000 0.000
(0.79) (0.83) (0.99) (0.87) (1.19) (1.03) (2.11) (1.02) (1.35)
5 Gross National Product -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000‡ -0.000‡ -0.000 -0.000
(-0.75) (-0.59) (-0.49) (-0.63) (-1.17) (-0.98) (-1.89) (-0.93) (-1.25)
6 Herding Effect 0.052 *** 0.049* 0.038* 0.048 *** 0.055 *** 0.053 **** 0.058**** 0.050 *** 0.053 ***
(2.56) (3.08) (2.09) (2.93) (3.27) (3.11) (3.68) (3.02) (3.04)
7 Age 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.72) (1.16) (1.41) (1.18) (0.93) (0.96) (1.21) (0.98) (1.04)
8 General Content 1.514 *** 1.526*** 1.478*** 4.021 *** 1.560 *** 1.493 *** 1.549*** 1.565 *** 1.448 ***
(2.78) (3.30) (3.06) (1.61) (3.07) (3.96) (3.10) (3.17) (3.26)
9 Sport Content 1.172 * 1.212* 1.169* 1.279 ** 1.096 ‡ 1.144 ** 1.397** 1.195 * 0.909 *
(1.78) (2.63) (2.48) (2.63) (1.78) (2.40) (2.64) (2.53) (2.17)
10 National Coverage 0.582 * 0.578* 0.591* 0.566 * 0.559 * 1.071 *** 0.978*** 0.592 * 0.888 ***
(1.64) (2.08) (2.26) (2.07) (2.03) (0.50) (3.10) (2.17) (3.17)
11 Regional Coverage -0.859**** -0.855**** -0.928**** -0.854 **** -0.899**** -0.500 -0.363 -0.865 **** -0.639**
(-3.24) (-3.66) (-3.94) (-3.65) (-3.73) (-0.32) (-1.28) (-3.67) (-2.57)
12 Family Firm -0.138 -0.199 -0.177 -0.218 -0.105 -0.116 -0.219 -0.091 -0.014
(-0.59) (-0.90) (-0.80) (-1.00) (-0.46) (-0.52) (-1.03) (-0.44) (-0.07)
13 Probability of Failure -1110.928 **** -1099.824**** -1123.379**** -1092,789**** -1124.234**** -11154.942**** -1147.532**** -1108.409**** -1066.022****
(-0.27) (-6.05) (-6.05) (-6.03) (-6.19) (-5.86) (-6.73) (-6.08) (-5.93)
-298.246 **** -297.779 **** -296.847**** -297.577 **** -297.905**** -298.213**** -293.985**** -298.084 **** -288.007****
142.03 148.04 147.77 148.94 144.53 150.99 149.97 144.57 144.10
10 11 12 11 12 11 12 11 12 
** **** 
Broad Scope Segment Scope
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Log Likelihood 
Global χ2 test 
(Degree of freedom) 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Geographic Scope Geographic Scope Location Scope Location ScopeSegment ScopeBroad Scope
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points α and ω; as a consequence, they would not be placed in indifference as we deduced in the 
theoretical section. Nonetheless, when we analyze the clearly significant model (Model 9 with a 
p-value < 0.000), we can see that the design coincides to the utmost detail. As a consequence, we 
consider that we have found support for the new evolutionary theoretical model and that the lack 
of sensitivity of other models is the consequence of error in measurement of different concepts of 
competition.   
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Fig. 3. Graph results. Each panel corresponds to one of the competition scopes calculated 
 
The findings obtained for the control variables are robust. We can see how the same variables are 
significant or not for every model. An interesting aspect with possible implications within this 
research stream, and that, in our opinion, deserves further commentary is the fact that Herding 
Effect and Probability of Failure are highly significant in all cases. In relation to the former, it 
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has a positive influence; that is, firms voluntarily disclose information because their rivals 
previously disclose the same type of information (Botosan and Harris, 2000, p. 333). The latter, 
the Probability of Failure, is also highly significant but negative with a very high coefficient. Our 
interpretation of this result is that, with the most minor bad news in relation to rivals, withholding 
information is the firm’s response. It could be the proof of the level of agency problem within 
this sector. 
 
6.3. Sensitivity analysis 
 
In the previous section, we have shown the tests only with the first harmonic (i.e. the first addend 
of the Fourier series). We can deduce the motive from Table 6. In this table, we compare the 
likelihood test for each model that includes the different summations of harmonics, from the first 
to the seventh. We do not estimate more harmonics in the remaining models because estimations 
do not converge. If we analyze the set of models according to each competition variable, we can 
see how the most significant model (Location Scope) is attained with the first harmonic. That is, 
despite including more harmonics to come closer to the real function, the fit is progressively 
worse. Including more variables does not help us come closer to the design. 
In relation to the second most significant (Geographic Scope), the result is the same up to the 
fifth harmonic, where the level of significance greatly improves. This is the main problem with 
non-parametric methodologies: we can fit our estimation to pass by every single point of the real 
function. Hence this case is a clear example that we can take even the outliers into consideration. 
We cannot forget that the transformation of this variable with 5 harmonics means including 10 
more variables. Despite improvement in the level of significance, it cannot compare with the 
Location Scope Model. Finally, the other two models, despite including all possible harmonics, 
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do not achieve a significance level lower than 0.05. Therefore, we prefer to include the same 
number of harmonics (one, in our case) for each model in Table 5 in order to compare the degree 
of fit to the real function with the same conditions. 
 
Table 6 
Fourier series analysis 
 
This table shows the likelihood rate test. The H0 of this test is: all coefficients of the Fourier series are not significant; 
compared to H1: at least some are significant. Each panel corresponds to a different competition scope. In the first 
line, we see the number of harmonics included in each series. The degree of freedom coincides with the number of 
variables included in the test. As a consequence, it coincides with twice the number of harmonics included in the 
Fourier series. We also see the value of each likelihood test (following a χ
2
 distribution) and their p-value. In bold, 
we show, according to our analysis, which harmonics are optimal. 
 
Another possibility to test the design of our theoretical model would have been to use another 
non-parametric process. However, to exploit the possibility of calculating likelihood ratio tests 
and, in this way, to be able to compare with typical parametric models, we must choose any 
family within B-splines. In our case, we chose the Chebyshev Polynomials (Sinwell, 2004). 
However, the results obtained were practically identical. 
 
Number of Harmonics (n) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 χ2 test 2.7989 4.7295 11.1701 ‡ 12.3029 13.5471 14.6025 17.9833
p-value 0.2467 0.3161 0.0832 0.1381 0.1946 0.2638 0.2075 
(Degree of freedom) 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 
χ2 test 0.6802 5.5653 6.6017 11.2937 13.59762 17.5169 22.8066 ‡
p-value 0.7110 0.6329 0.3592 0.1856 0.1921 0.1311 0.0634 
(Degree of freedom) 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 
 χ2 test 8.5225 * 12.4391 * 14.2600 * 14.9982 ‡ 26.2483 *** 29.1275 *** 30.7733 **
p-value 0.0141 0.0143 0.0268 0.0591 0.0034 0.0037 0.0059 
(Degree of freedom) 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 
 χ2 test 20.4786 **** 22.6099 **** 23.2128 **** 27.5763 **** 29.4315 *** 31.7710 *** 38.4902 ****
p-value 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 0.0004 
(Degree of freedom) 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 
Geographic Scope
Location Scope 
Broad Scope
Segment Scope
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7. Conclusion 
 
To analyze the influence of existing competition on the probability of voluntary disclosure, it is 
necessary to take the fact that it is an evolutionary process into consideration. This process goes 
through different phases according to the sector’s maturity. First, fear of proprietary costs 
generates the typical negative slope between both variables (Verrecchia, 1983). However, when 
private information loses its strategic nature, this old fear is substituted by indifference, which 
changes the sign of the relationship (Harris, 1998). This sign continues to be the same despite the 
fact that indifference is replaced by the incentive to avoid overproduction (Darrough and 
Stoughton, 1990). And finally, when the sector is clearly at its stage of maximum maturity, it is 
able to anticipate the significant information which makes voluntary disclosure irrelevant, 
generating managers’ indifference once again (Clinch and Verrecchia, 1997).  This reasoning 
implies a non-monotonic design. In this paper, we have permitted data to speak for itself with no 
empirical restrictions. We have chosen non-parametric methodologies that have found support 
for our theoretical reasoning.  However, these findings compel us some aspects to be reviewed. 
For instance, this design facilitates the finding of positive slopes when we adjust linear 
regressions. This may be the main reason that most of the test has found this sign. However, as 
the function is non-monotonic, depending on the distribution of data obtained from each sector, it 
could be to find non-significant tests. In particular, this result is what we have obtained in this 
paper.  In spite of proving that Location Scope Competition has a high level of significance (P-
value < 0.0000) when we use the appropriate methodology, when we use linear regression all 
evidence disappears. Thus, not only is it deemed fit to find the correct variables (Ali et al., 2009), 
but it would also be interesting to apply more sophisticated econometric methods. In any case, 
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the real difficulty, due to its shape, is finding negative designs. Previous findings could suggest 
that these tests did not possess the entire distribution of data.  
A second disturbing aspect is the inclusion of several sectors in the same test. Each industry 
could be at a different stage of maturity and, as a consequence, the results found would be the 
effect of each sector’s random situation in relation to the rest, and not what concerns us, the 
relationship between competition and voluntary disclosure.  
Continuing with this same argument, we consider that each sector has its own idiosyncrasy. In 
our case, we have found a very symmetrical shape. The height and length of the harmonic’s 
frequency in phases 3 and 4 are very similar to the depth (and length) in phases 1 and 2. In fact, 
the point of indifference λ is located practically in the middle of the range. However, these 
aspects will depend on the strategic character of the information that we analyze, and of the 
capability of the sector to forecast this information. In our opinion, a highly technological sector 
which requires strong investment in research and development and where this information is 
difficult to replicate or estimate is not the same as a sector where this is not necessary. In both 
cases, the variability of the harmonic, while respecting the same initial shape, could be very 
different. Interesting future research could be to compare two or more sectors in relation to their 
evolution.  
The way to measure competition generates several fronts of controversy. We have closed in on 
several dimensions of competition in our population and we have proven how one measure does 
not have the slightest level of significance, yet there are others with a degree of significance that 
is more than interesting. In our opinion, in our case, the non-significant variables are simply not 
measures of competition in this sector. Newspapers compete with their peers in the same 
location, thus variables such as Location or Geographic Scope are significant in the test, whereas 
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global competition measures, like Broad, or Segment Scope, are meaningless in this industry. If 
we had not taken this aspect into consideration, we would not have an acceptable measurement. 
The second open front is in relation to the classification between existing, perceived or expected 
competition. We have only gathered archival data and, as a consequence, we can only discuss 
existing competition, not perceived or expected. In relation to perceived competition, our opinion 
is that it is clear that decision makers take their decisions in relation to what they believe to 
know. As we only have archival data, we could have found deviations from our theoretical 
pattern such as the Geographical Scope variable in relation to the initial or final points of 
indifference. We could have found initial influences of less than one or, on the contrary, final 
influences greater than one. However, we have the Location Scope variable where deviation in 
this regard does not exist. Therefore, with the evidence of Location Scope, we believe that in our 
case, perceived competition is very close to real competition. And addressing the Geographical 
Scope results, we consider that the deviation is really an error of measurement of the variable and 
not the difference between existing and perceived competition. 
Very similarly, when we speak about ex post competition, we could arrive at similar conclusions; 
however, as we have found evidence about α and ω being indifference points with influences 
similar to one, if there is some deviation caused by expected competition, it should influence the 
slopes of the relationship within the range of competition while the sector is maturing. It would 
be very interesting future research if we could split both effects: existing competition, on the one 
hand, and the effect of expected competition on the other. 
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